The -loans for shares‖ scheme of 1995-6-in which a handful of wellconnected businessmen bought stakes in major Russian companies-is widely considered a scandalous affair that had disastrous consequences for the Russian economy. Fifteen years later, I reexamine the details of the program in light of evidence available today. The critics were right that the scheme's execution appeared corrupt. However, in most other regards the conventional wisdom turns out to be wrong. The stakes involved represented a small fraction of the market; the pricing in most cases was in line with international practice; and the scheme can only explain a small part of Russia's increasing wealth inequality. The biggest beneficiaries were not the so-called -oligarchs,‖ but Soviet-era industrial managers. After the oligarchs consolidated control, their firms performed far better than comparable state enterprises and helped fuel Russia's rapid growth after 1999. Published in Post-Soviet Affairs, 26, 3, July-September 2010, 207-27. The facts of the scheme were actually quite simple. The government gave-usually minority-tranches of shares in 12 large, state-owned corporations to certain businessmen to manage in trust, in return for loans to the federal budget totaling about $800 million. Besides Surgutneftegaz, the companies included the oil corporations LUKoil, Yukos, Sidanko, and Sibneft as well as the nickel producer Norilsk Nickel and the Mechel and Novolipetsk Steel Works. If the government did not repay the loans by September 1996, the creditors were then allowed to auction off the tranches and keep 30 percent of any profit. In the event, the government did not repay the loans, and the creditors sold the stakes, usually to themselves.
On November 3, 1995, in the remote Siberian town of Surgut, an auction took place for the right to lend the cash-strapped Russian government tens of millions of dollars. As collateral for the loan, the government had pledged a 40 percent stake in the country's fifth largest oil company, Surgutneftegaz. Two bidders made it into the auction room; a third had been disqualified because of problems with the applicant's paperwork. Had any others planned to fly out from Moscow to participate, they would have had trouble: the local airport mysteriously chose to close that day.
When, late in the evening, the participants emerged, the winner turned out to be Surgutneftegaz's own pension fund.
Thus began what came to be known as -loans for shares.‖ This program, under which stakes in 12 companies were eventually sold to selected private investors, quickly took on mythic proportions in accounts of Russia's economic transformation. Widely condemned, it became a symbol of all the errors and sins-real or alleged-of Yeltsin's reformers. The program was a -Faustian bargain,‖ wrote one journalist, a -fiendishly complicated scheme,‖ in which the liberal ministers had sold their souls to a cabal of unscrupulous tycoons, who-switching metaphorsquickly metamorphosed into a -Frankenstein's monster.‖ It -deformed‖ the economy, -impoverished‖ the population, and laid -a corrupt, inegalitarian foundation for everything that came after it‖ (Freeland, 2000, pp.22-3, 169-89) . Under loans for shares, contended one Nobelprize-winning economist, the country's best firms were stripped of their assets. -The enterprises were left on the verge of bankruptcy, while the oligarchs' bank accounts were enriched‖ (Stiglitz, 2002, p.160) .
Given the resonance the program had-and continues to have even 15 years later-it is worth revisiting the details to see how well the popular image fits the facts. Based on what we now know, were the claims of the program's critics justified? Do the interpretations offered at the time fit the evidence available today?
The facts of the scheme were actually quite simple. The government gave-usually minority-tranches of shares in 12 large, state-owned corporations to certain businessmen to manage in trust, in return for loans to the federal budget totaling about $800 million. Besides Surgutneftegaz, the companies included the oil corporations LUKoil, Yukos, Sidanko, and Sibneft as well as the nickel producer Norilsk Nickel and the Mechel and Novolipetsk Steel Works. If the government did not repay the loans by September 1996, the creditors were then allowed to auction off the tranches and keep 30 percent of any profit. In the event, the government did not repay the loans, and the creditors sold the stakes, usually to themselves.
Competition was kept to a minimum through careful rigging of the auctions.
In this paper, I attempt to answer five questions. How large were the stakes involved?
Did the auction winners underpay, and if so, by how much? Why did the government agree to the program? How was it implemented? And what consequences did it have for the companies involved, for the country's rate of growth, and for economic inequality? I find that the critics were correct that the scheme's execution appeared corrupt. It is also true that in the three years after the auctions, the winners did their utmost to squeeze out minority shareholders in ways fair and foul.
Beyond that, however, the conventional wisdom appears wrong on numerous points. I find that: the program's scale was far more modest than suggested at the time; the pricing was, in most cases, in line with international practice; the biggest winners were not the so-called -oligarchs,‖ but entrenched Soviet-era managers; subsequent performance of the main loans for shares firms was far better than that of similar companies that remained state owned; and the dramatic output increases of the oligarch firms helped fuel Russia's impressive growth after 1999.
In short, the way implementation of the scheme was handed over to interested parties was a scandal, but there is little evidence that the program had most of the negative consequences attributed to it. On the contrary, it helped catalyze Russia's eventual rebound.
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HOW LARGE WERE THE STAKES INVOLVED?
Journalists characterized the 12 companies whose shares were pledged as the -crown jewels‖ and -behemoths‖ of the Russian economy (e.g. Freeland, 2000, p.170) . From the coverage, one could easily get the impression that a large slice of Russia's industrial base changed hands in the operation. In fact, although some of the companies were significant ones, the scale was rather more modest.
The original plan had foreseen inclusion of 43 enterprises (Kokh, 1998, p.108) . But the managers of most of these managed to arrange the exclusion of their companies, bringing the total down to 16. Four of these failed to attract a single bid. Of the 12 companies for which there were bids, most were already trading on Moscow's stock markets as of late 1995. If one values the shares pledged by the government at their market prices when the program began, their total value came to about $1.5-1.9 billion, or 8-10 percent of the total capitalization of the Russian stock market at that time.
3 For comparison, an estimated $2.5 billion worth of stock in just the 2 For an authoritative account of the ideas behind Russian privatization and how it was implemented in practice, see Boycko et al. (1995) . 3 The figure is only approximate, since share prices were not available for two of the 12 companies-Sidanko, and the much smaller Nafta-Moskva. The market capitalizations of the stakes in the other 10 companies on October 2, 1995, as recorded in the database of the magazine Ekspert, sum to $1.45 billion (http://raexpert.ru/ratings/expert400/1995/capitalization/), or 7.6 percent of the total market capitalization of $19 billion (Russian Economic Trends, 1996, p.114 measures value added, whereas the firms' revenues do not take into account costs, so the nine percent figure exaggerates their contribution to GDP.
higher revenues than all 12 companies together. In short, the program involved several major firms, but the stakes transferred amounted to only a relatively small portion of the economy.
DID THE WINNERS UNDERPAY, AND IF SO BY HOW MUCH?
There are various ways one might assess the value of the stakes. One method would be to compare the Russian companies involved to others with similar assets in other parts of the world.
Journalists looked at the valuations of Western oil companies per barrel of oil reserves and concluded that the Russian oil companies were grossly underpriced.
However, such comparisons are extremely misleading. The value of a company is not simply the sum of its assets. One must also factor in its liabilities and the risks. Many of the corporations whose shares were pledged had staggering debts, for which a new owner would become responsible. One subsidiary of Sibneft owed $2 billion (Sborov, 1996) . According to Khodorkovsky, when he bought into Yukos the company's debts came to $3 billion (Pirani, 2000) . Potanin said that Norilsk Nickel was losing $800 million a year, and that its debts totaled $2 billion (Brady, 2000, p.222) . Even if they were exaggerating, the liabilities were known to be enormous and rising.
As for the risks, these piled up, layer upon layer. Even if Zyuganov and the Communists did not win power, to restructure the companies and make them profitable, the winners of the auctions would have to fight punishing battles against the entrenched, Soviet-era managers, with their contacts in local law enforcement and sometimes organized crime. In 1995, the main oil producing unit of Yukos, Yuganskneftegaz, was selling its output through a network of Chechen gangsters (Panyushkin, 2006, pp.82-92) .
Most of the oligarchs survived assassination attempts. There was no guarantee that the new stakeholders would prevail in the struggle for control. Meanwhile, the incumbent managers would be stripping value from the firms, selling their assets to keep them from the new investors.
Simultaneously, the winners might face -greenmail‖ from minority shareholders, who would block restructuring in the hope of being bought out at an exorbitant price.
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A third layer of risk resulted from the dramatic fluctuations in the prices of the commodities that the pledged enterprises produced. Oil and nickel prices had plunged in the 1990s. They would fall still further in 1998. Not surprisingly, profits at these companies and their 6 This is Goldfarb's account (see Goldfarb and Litvinenko, 2007, p.56 share prices varied with the prices of their main products. At the same time, even a nonCommunist government would be tempted to solve its budget problems by increasing taxation of the oil and minerals sectors. Thus, it was not clear how high after-tax profits would be even if commodity prices recovered.
To summarize, for these companies to become profitable with high share prices the
Communists would have to lose the 1996 election, mineral prices would have to recover, the government would have to refrain from punitive taxation, and the new outside investors would have to succeed in forcing out entrenched managers and organized crime, overcoming -greenmail‖ from minority shareholders, and restructuring the companies. Given the low probability that all these things would come to pass, it is not surprising that the stakes sold for less than they might have been worth in a world with less risk. Nor is it surprising that in a number of cases, stakes in similar companies that the government tried to sell in these years failed to attract any buyers at all. In 1997, auctions of stakes in Tyumen Oil, Eastern Oil, Slavneft, LUKoil, and Rosneft all had to be postponed or cancelled for lack of bids (Russian Economic Trends, 1998a, p.90) .
Another way to value companies is by reference to their market value at some point in the future. Thus, observers often claimed that the loans for shares stakes were sold very cheaply because the companies' capitalizations later increased. Reporters expressed outrage that in late 1997 some of the loans for shares companies were valued at many times their capitalization in late 1995 when the program started (e.g. Klebnikov, 2000, p.207) . Again, this ignores the risks involved. In fact, Russian markets crashed soon after the high 1997 valuations. By 1998 and 1999, the capitalizations of some of these companies had fallen far below their values when the loan auctions took place. (1997, p.108; 1998a, p.88; 1998b, p.44) ; The Moscow Times (August 1, 1996; August 30, 1996; September 3, 1996) ; Ekspert database. Total price received by state is adjusted for the creditor's 30 percent commission on the sale. n.i.: no information.
companies, based on the 1995 capitalizations, the total discount received came to about $727 million; using 1996 valuations, it was $1.36 billion.
If one accepts these rough estimates, they suggest several things. First, by this metric, the winners did pay less than the market value of the shares. Again, however, some context is useful.
In fact, some discount is virtually universal in IPOs or major share issues by state-owned companies, and the discount tends to be large in developing and middle income countries. A discount is considered necessary to ensure the placement of large blocks of shares simultaneously. Laurin et al. studied privatizations in 10 emerging markets (other than Russia) and found that on average state companies that were privatizing underpriced their share offerings by about 34 percent relative to the stock price after the first day (Laurin et al., 2004, p.415 12 In this light, most of the discounts for the Russian loans for shares companies do not look completely out of line.
Second, Table 1 suggests that the biggest winners from the program were not the socalled oligarchs-outside investors who raised their seed capital in trade and banking-but the -red directors‖-insiders who used the program to consolidate control over companies they already managed. However one estimates the discounts, by far the largest went to the managers of LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz, who bought shares in their own corporations-in Surgutneftegaz's shareholders, would benefit from the value created by such investments. In some cases, it was reported that the investments were not made.
12 That is, one day after the share issues, the Malaysian shares were worth 134 percent more and the Singapore shares were worth 42 percent more (Ariff et al., 2007) .
case, using money from the firm's own pension fund. Valued at October 1995 share prices, the winners of the stakes in LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz got a total discount of $542 million; on their stakes in Yukos, Sibneft, and Norilsk Nickel, Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky, and Potanin received a total discount of $185 million.
For comparison, consider again the privatization of Gazprom, the most valuable corporation controlled by red directors. Of the 58.9 percent of the company's shares given away for privatization vouchers in the early 1990s, 10 percent were initially transferred to the company itself in return for vouchers and later sold at very low prices to affiliated firms -owned largely by relatives and associates of top Gazprom executives.‖ 13 Another 15 percent were distributed to the company's workers. Another 33.9 percent were sold at voucher auctions run by the company in different regions of Russia. In October 1995 as the loans for shares auctions got underway, Gazprom's market capitalization was $4.3 billion. 14 Thus, value worth $2.5 billion was given away for vouchers, at least $1 billion of this to the management and workers. Next to this, the roughly $185 million discount to the three oligarchs looks somewhat less dramatic.
HOW WAS THE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED?
The way the auctions were conducted-both those for the right to lend and those for the sharesgave the impression of blatant cronyism (Hoffman, 2003, pp.312-20) . The winners often turned out to be front companies for the auctioneers themselves. Winning bids came in just marginally above the starting price. In some cases, arbitrary conditions were imposed that would be hard for any but the designated winner to fulfill. Surgutneftegaz held its auction in a remote Siberian (Kokh, 1998, pp.121-6) . The abuses were no worse than those occurring in thousands of companies around the country that were being privatized by insiders to themselves or their associates. But they were more public. For those eager to discredit privatization, the seamy spectacle was a godsend.
WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT AGREE TO THE SCHEME?
The idea for loans for shares, by all accounts, came from the banker Vladimir Potanin. Why did privatization chief Anatoli Chubais and then the rest of the government agree? Those involved mention several interconnected reasons. First, the authorities were desperate to raise money.
Large revenues from privatization had been factored into the budget, and were vital to finance the deficit and prevent a relapse into hyperinflation, which was finally subsiding in 1995. But the Duma had imposed a ban on privatizing stakes in oil companies, and privatization had all but ground to a halt. 16 As of September 1995, privatization had generated only 162 billion rubles (about $36 million) of the 8.7 trillion rubles budgeted (about $1.9 billion) (Brady, 2000, p.135) .
Without the roughly $800 million provided by the banks in loans for shares, the government probably could not have sustained its victory over inflation.
15 Some of the apparent technicalities may not have been so technical; there were genuine questions about whether some of the bidders actually had the cash to pay the amounts they said they wanted to bid. 16 For the ban, see the Federal Budget Law, in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 13, 1995, Article 12.
Second, the privatizers were eager to inject competent management into the major industrial companies and begin restructuring. The old managers were diverting assets, running up billion dollar debts, and not paying their workers. Dislodging the more corrupt and incompetent red directors would get much harder if, as expected, the Communists increased their control over parliament in the December 1995 election. These enterprises would remain stuck in the state sector for years, unreformed, inefficient, and holding back any recovery rather than fueling it.
Loans for shares was a way to circumvent the Duma's ban on privatizing oil companies and get private entrepreneurs into management positions. This was the argument that Chubais emphasized in discussions with international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. campaign. Moreover, if David Hoffman of The Washington Post is correct that the oligarchs actually made net profits from the election campaign through special deals with low-cost government bonds, then additional financial sweeteners were hardly needed to win their support.
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Even if such electoral considerations motivated the program's introduction, they do not explain why the government did not raise the money to repay the loans in August 1996 after Yeltsin had been reelected and the danger of Communist revanche had passed. Admittedly, the government was extremely short of cash. But had it raised the eight hundred million dollars to repay the loans, it could have earned even more by reselling the stakes to the highest bidder. The market price of some of these had risen considerably since the previous year. Instead, Potanin, one of the winners, was brought into the government.
Until Chubais or another insider publishes a frank memoir, we will not know the answer to this. Critics of the government often imply that the reason was straightforward corruption on the part of individuals involved. But no concrete allegation of a payoff has surfaced. This is somewhat surprising given that Gusinsky and Berezovsky fell out with the government reformers in 1997 over the sale of a stake in the communications monopoly Svyazinvest to Potanin and used their press holdings to deluge their adversaries with mud. 20 At that time, the two media magnates publicized the fact that advances of $90,000 had been paid to five members of the privatization team for chapters they were to write in a book on privatization. 21 However, these honoraria were alleged to be hidden payoffs related to the Svyazinvest deal, not to the original loans for shares transactions. Ironically, what caused the oligarchs' ire over the Svyazinvest deal was that it had been completely honest: the price was very high, and there was no rigging of the bids in Gusinsky's favor.
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My guess is that in the summer of 1996, the key players were simply too preoccupied with getting Yeltsin heart surgery and keeping him alive to contemplate reversing the loans for shares deals. They only had a couple of months between Yeltsin's election victory and the deadline for repaying the loans. The battle with the loans-for-shares winners would have been bruising, as demonstrated by the clashes later over Svyazinvest. With the president extremely sick, the reformers may have simply thought such a course too dangerous.
HOW DID THE CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP AFFECT THE COMPANIES' PERFORMANCE?
Did the new owners depress investment and output growth and strip their corporations' assets, as the critics claimed? In fact, the oligarch-controlled companies performed extremely well, and far better than many comparable enterprises that remained controlled by the state or by their Sovietera managers.
Initially, the oligarchs faced formidable challenges-wrestling control from the existing management teams, cleaning out organized crime from the factories, dealing with the corporations' massive debts, and consolidating ownership. The first priority of Khodorkovsky, 21 Such honoraria were perfectly legal, but seemed large. The recipients said they were donating 95 percent of the amount to charity. The book was published in 1999.
22 See Hoffman's detailed account (2003, pp.372-96) .
Potanin, and Berezovsky was to increase their stakes in the companies and in their subsidiaries, and they pursued this end aggressively, breaking or at least bending the law where necessary. In some cases, the oligarchs diluted the ownership of minority shareholders through additional share issues. The tricks they used were not particularly original-they had been tried and tested in economically rising countries around the world, including in the US oil industry of the early 20 th Century, where business tactics included extortion, theft, and even murder (Landers, 2000) . Of course, their lack of originality does not make such practices any more defensible.
After they had consolidated their ownership, the Russian tycoons ran their companies far better than they had been managed before the takeover. They were interested in attracting foreign investors and reselling stakes for a profit. To do this, they needed to restructure their companies, introduce international standards of accounting and disclosure, and appoint independent board Sibneft's market capitalization increased by more than 10 times, and that of Yukos by more than 50 times in dollar terms. 24 (During this period, the RTS market average increased by about three times.) Nor was it the case that the oligarchs had simply chosen for themselves the companies with the best prospects. As Figure 1 shows, productivity in the oligarchs' oil companies when they bought their stakes in 1996 was lower than that in either the largest state-owned companies or those controlled by red directors.
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Were the oligarchs stripping assets from the companies they controlled? They certainly reduced the value of the shares held by minority shareholders initially. After the 1998 crisis, they defaulted on loans to Western banks. But after the oligarchs consolidated control, their companies' audited financial statements suggest that far from stripping assets, they were actively investing, building plants, replacing equipment, and developing their property. Between 1998 and
2003, annual -upstream‖ investment in the two oligarch-controlled oil companies Yukos and
Sibneft increased by about 140 percent (see Table 2 25 A number of other studies have also found better performance in the oligarch-owned companies than in other Russian-owned companies (although those owned by foreign investors tend to do best of all). See Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) and Boone and Rodionov (2001) . million a year. There is no evidence here that the oligarchs' companies were increasing their capital spending more slowly than their counterparts.
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26 My point here is not that the oligarchs were investing more than the Soviet era managers of LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz; as Table 2 shows, they were also investing a lot. In fact, the most serious asset stripping scandals involved companies in which the state retained large stakes. In the 1990s, Gazprom's management was accused of diverting assets into a network of companies owned by the managers (Åslund, 2007, p.142) . Assets of the state-owned airline Aeroflot fell between 1997 and 2002. 27 Indeed, it is striking how differently the oligarchs behaved in companies they owned and in those where they merely influenced the management (such as Aeroflot, where Berezovsky had partial control). The claim that they privatized firms in order to strip assets gets it backwards. They-along with the red directors-stripped assets from state-controlled companies in order to accumulate funds to buy shares when such enterprises were sold. The need to stop such theft was one of the main reasons to hasten privatization. 27 Data from Aeroflot's annual financial statements.
HOW DID THE OLIGARCHS' CONTROL OVER MAJOR COMPANIES AFFECT THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY?
Did the after-effects of loans for shares depress economic growth? In fact, the opposite is true.
Russia Since then, the poverty rate has fallen to 13 percent (Goskomstat Rossiiskoy Federatsii, various years). What about inequality? The wealth of Russian big businessmen did expand dramatically in the years after the loans for shares sales, and this must have exacerbated wealth inequality.
However, this was true of both those who participated in loans for shares and the many more who did not. Fortunes were created by the rise in world commodity prices, the restructuring of Russian enterprises, and the consequent ascent of the Russian stock market. 30 See Freeland et al. (1996) . The seven bankers mentioned were Berezovsky, Mikhail wrongly-that they had full control already over the companies in which they were managing stakes under the loans for shares program, the total revenues of the seven tycoons' main industrial properties in 1996 would come to about six percent of GDP (or 7.7 percent of total value added of the non-state sector). This is the total for Norilsk Nickel, Novolipetsk Metal Works, Sidanko, Yukos, Sibneft, AvtoVAZ, Mechel, Apatit, and Aeroflot, calculated using the Ekspert database.
Including the revenues of their banks, television companies, and shipping companies (for which figures were not available) would increase the total, but it is hard to imagine it would end up above 10 percent of GDP. If we take into account that oil companies often engaged in transfer pricing, so that part of the value was realized by trade companies rather than the oil company itself, this could conceivably raise the oligarchs' holdings to 15 percent of GDP. Still the 50 percent claim was widely repeated as if credible by both the tycoons' promoters and their detractors.
Even Berezovsky only got in at the last minute. The loans for shares winners were a small subset of Russia's wealthy at the time, and an even smaller subset today.
CONCLUSION
In the loans for shares program of 1995-6, stakes in state-owned enterprises valued by the market at around $1.5-1.9 billion were sold to a mix of brash private entrepreneurs (-oligarchs‖) and Soviet-era industrial managers (-red directors‖) for about $850 million. 31 The details of the arrangement and the way the auctions were conducted suggested blatant cronyism. Although the discounts on market prices for the stakes sold to the red directors were unusually large, the discounts on the sales to the oligarchs were in the range customary for emerging market privatizations. The value of the stakes involved-amounting to less than 10 percent of total market capitalization at that time-was less than the market value of the shares in the single company Gazprom that were given away for free in return for privatization vouchers.
Those companies acquired by the oligarchs-after an initial period in which minority investors were squeezed out, often in disreputable ways-performed extremely well, reorganizing their operations and increasing productivity far faster than similar companies that remained state owned, and somewhat faster than those that were privatized to Soviet-era managers. The oligarchs' companies were the driving force behind the commodity boom of the early 2000s.
Their very success made them attractive targets for takeovers-hostile or otherwise-by the new security service businessmen of President Putin's entourage. 31 To get the $850 mn figure, I have added the loan amounts for Mechel, Nafta Moskva, and
Murmansk, North-West and Novorossiysk Shipping to the total price received by the state for the other stakes, since I could find no information that the holders of the shares in these five companies had paid more than this in the subsequent auctions for the shares.
The Russian oligarchs were hardly a unique phenomenon. As La Porta et al. have shown, concentrated ownership is common in most developing and many developed countries (La Porta et al., 1999) . In Mexico, to take just one example, powerful families hold monopolies over the production of everything from cement to tortillas, and television is a duopoly of two competing tycoons (Coster, 2007 If the facts as presented in this article are correct, why were the scale, significance, and negative impact of the loans for shares program so exaggerated by contemporary opinionmakers? For different reasons, the mystique of the all-powerful oligarchs appealed to almost everyone (Treisman, 2010) . It paid off richly, first of all, for the oligarchs themselves. Besides gratifying their vanity, it attracted investment partners and won these recent outsiders, who a few years earlier had been driving cabs or selling automobile parts, the respect and assistance of lower 32 Lacey (2009). Slim and Salinas both deny that there was anything untoward about the deal. level bureaucrats. Among many ordinary Russians, it resonated with the suspicion of wealth and enterprise engendered by decades of communist socialization. For the Communists, the image of a clique of super-capitalists-many of them Jewish-manipulating the president was almost too good to be true. 33 For Western journalists, the oligarch saga made for a simple story that could explain the corruption and chaos of Russian politics to readers in terms of a few vivid personalities. For reformers in the government such as Boris Nemtsov, the oligarchs became a convenient excuse for failure and a target against whom public anger could be deflected.
In fact, the biggest winners from loans for shares-as from most controversial policies in the 1990s-were not the upstart entrepreneurs but the aristocrats of the old Soviet order who had occupied the commanding heights of industry as the ancien regime collapsed. Vagit Alekperov, the last acting Soviet oil minister, built the company LUKoil out of the country's best oil fields and refineries, and then left government to become its president. In the course of privatization, LUKoil's managers and employees obtained a major stake in the company-at least 36 percent as of 1996, by one estimate-only one seventh of this via loans for shares (Lane, 1999, p.28 who had been in high administrative posts or enterprise management before 1991, and the -outsiders,‖ who were -younger, had higher human capital (i.e. had higher degrees from elite universities or institutes), and were disproportionately of Jewish ethnicity.‖ lobbying that oil and gas prices were not liberalized for years in the early 1990s, creating billions of dollars of arbitrage profits for those in control of the plants. Soskovets obtained tax exemptions for the metals industry that, according to Åslund, were worth about two percent of GDP (Åslund, 2007, p.138) . By contrast, the three years after loans for shares saw the oligarchs repeatedly thwarted in their designs and subjected to intensifying pressure to pay their companies' tax debts.
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The loans for shares scheme was a public relations disaster. It did not by itself discredit privatization with the Russian public. Surveys show that privatization is unpopular in all the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe, and less unpopular in Russia than in some others such as Hungary that had relatively uncontroversial privatizations. 38 But the negative image of the program became a resource for populists to exploit. It remains valuable to those in Russia who 37 Three did, at one point or other, serve as executive branch officials. In 1992, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky was an advisor to the Russian energy minister. For about six months in 1996-7, Vladimir Potanin served as deputy prime minister. Boris Berezovsky also served for about a year as deputy secretary of the Security Council. These jobs gave them the opportunity to lobby from inside the tent rather than from outside and to meddle in personnel matters. However, I am not aware of any decisions that were made under their influence while they were in government that the Prime Minister or President was not inclined to make anyway. In fact, the oligarchs lost almost all the main fights they were involved in during this period (see Treisman, 2010) .
38 Denisova and colleagues (2007) surveyed the populations of 28 countries and found that on average only 19 percent thought that privatized companies should be left in the hands of their current owners without any change. In Russia, the proportion saying this was 18.5 percent, in Hungary 13.3.
wish to improve perceptions of the current regime by contrasting it with the perceived corruption of the Yeltsin administration.
